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Abstract:  
I present a model of conformism in social networks that incorporates both peer effects 
and self-selection. I find that equilibrium behaviors are linked through the Laplacian 
matrix of the equilibrium network. I show that conformism has positive social value and 
that social welfare can be bounded by network centrality and connectivity measures. I 
apply the model using empirical data on high school student participation in 
extracurricular activities. I find that the local effects of conformism (i.e. endogenous peer 
effect for a fixed network structure) range from 7.5% to 45%, depending on the number 
of peers that an individual has. Simulations show that the optimal policies of an 
inequality-averse policy-maker change in relation to the size of a school. Small schools 
should encourage shy students to integrate more with other students, while large 
schools should focus on promoting role models within the school. 
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1. Introduction
Do teenagers smoke because their friends smoke, or do they smoke in the
hope of making new friends? Does peer pressure come from influence or self-
selection?
The literature on peer effects in social networks has mainly focused on in-
fluence, while the literature on network formation has focused on self-selection.
To date, these two sources of social interactions have mainly been studied sep-
arately.
In this paper, I present a model of conformism in social networks, where
both peer effects and self-selection affect behavior. The magnitude of each
effect can be clearly identified because changes to an individual’s peer group
induce discontinuous changes in the individual’s behavior, while changes in how
an individual’s peers behave (holding constant who an individual chooses as his
peers) induces continuous changes in the individual’s behavior. This is impor-
tant as I show that peer effects and self-selection have different policy implica-
tions. I characterize the set of all (Nash) equilibria and present an equilibrium
refinement (perfect and robust) based on the potential function of the game.
I estimate the model using student-level data on participation in high school
activities.
I characterize the relationship between individual behavior and the network
structure for all equilibria of the game. Behavior can be expressed as a function
of the Laplacian matrix of the network. This specific mathematical structure
implies that individuals are affected by the entire distribution of their peers’
behavior, and not just the average behavior of their peers. As a result, the
overall impact of conformism on the outcome variable increases with the number
of peers an individual has, with each marginal peer having less impact than the
previous one.
I show that, for a social planer with quadratic preferences, equilibria can
be ranked according to the variance of the equilibrium behaviors and that con-
formism has positive social value. I present bounds for the equilibrium variance
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based on the structure of the equilibrium network. The variance is bounded
below by a measure of network centrality and above by a function of the edge-
connectivity of the network.
This has powerful policy implications. A social planer who wants to prevent
the emergence of bad equilibria should promote integration and ensure that no
group of individuals is isolated from the rest of the network. A social planer who
wants to support the emergence of good equilibria should focus on promoting
role models. A comprehensive public policy should thus consider both centrality
and connectivity.
I apply the model empirically using data on the choice of extracurricular
activities by high school students.1 Although it is not feasible to estimate the
true model, I provide bounds for the density of the equilibrium network; each
bound can be interpreted as a latent space model (see, for example, Goldsmith-
Pinkham & Imbens (2013)). In practice, the bounds lead to roughly the same
estimated parameters. Depending on the number of peers that a student has,
the local impact of conformism (that is, the endogenous peer effect for a given
network structure) ranges from 7.5% to 45%. Using simulations, I show that the
cost of increasing connectivity in small schools is relatively low and may lead to
large welfare gains. The opposite is true for large schools where the cost is high
and the benefit to welfare is low. This suggests that small schools should focus
on connectivity and large schools should focus on centrality.
This paper contributes to the literature on conformism in social networks. I
focus on quadratic preferences, as in Bisin et al. (2006), Bisin & O¨zgu¨r (2012)
and Patacchini & Zenou (2012). Bisin et al. (2006) and Bisin & O¨zgu¨r (2012)
present dynamic theoretical models for fixed network structures and provide
identification conditions. Patacchini & Zenou (2012) also focus on quadratic
preferences and present an empirical application, which assumes that the net-
work is exogenous. I present a static model of conformism with quadratic pref-
erences and self-selection.
1Such activities include chess clubs and sport teams, for example.
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This paper also contributes to the theoretical literature featuring games in
endogenous networks. Hojman & Szeidl (2006) present a model where individ-
uals simultaneously choose their behavior and the agents that they link with
within a network. They find that, with mostly homogeneous agents, the equilib-
rium network is minimally connected. Herman (2013) and Kinateder & Merlino
(2014)) focus on the provision of local public goods. This paper complements
the literature by focusing on conformism among heterogeneous agents and by
showing that equilibrium behaviors are linked through the Laplacian matrix of
the equilibrium network.
This paper also contributes to the recent empirical literature on peer effects
in endogenous networks. Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013) and Hsieh & Lee
(2011) present models where there is endogeneity, which is due to the presence
of an unobserved variable. They find that the estimated endogenous effects,
controlling for the endogeneity of the network, are similar to those estimated
when the network is exogenous. Using a similar approach, Patacchini & Rainone
(2014) also find that the bias due to the potential endogeneity of a network’s
structure is small. However, as noted by Badev (2013) and by Boucher & Fortin
(2014), this does not imply that the network formation process can be ignored,
since it may still affect the efficiency of public policies. For instance, Badev
(2013) finds that ignoring the network formation process leads to biases (from
10% to 15%) on the predicted impact of public policies.
In this paper, as in Badev (2013), the endogeneity is created by the fact that
the endogenous variable (behavior) directly affects the value of links, assuming
that all the relevant variables are observed. I also find a small bias on the
estimated parameters, although the endogenous structure of the network may
still strongly impact the effectiveness of public policies. I provide additional
insights as of why the network formation process does not substantially bias the
estimated impact of peer effect for the AddHealth database.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. In section 2, I present a microeco-
nomic model where individuals simultaneously choose their behavior and their
peer groups. In section 3, I present an empirical application using data on
3
student participation in extracurricular activities. I conclude in section 4.
2. The Microeconomic Model
The economy is composed of n individuals. Individuals simultaneously make
two decisions: their behavior (yi ∈ R), and their peers (gi ∈ {0, 1}n−1). I assume
that individuals have preferences for conformism:2
ui(y, g) =
∑
j 6=i
[
zijδ − λ
2
(yi − yj)2 + ηij
]
gijgji − 1
2
(yi − xiβ − εi)2
where λ ≥ 0, zij = zji is a vector of pair-specific characteristics,3 and xi is a
vector of individual characteristics. The distributions of the unobserved shocks
εi and ηij = ηji are left free for the moment, but distributional assumptions will
be made in section 3. Individuals incur a cost if they choose a behavior yi that is
different than their type (i.e. xiβ+εi), and different than their peers’ behavior,
yj . However, individuals gain from forming connections with peers that provide
a net positive value. Since the value of a link is multiplied by gijgji, a link is
only created under mutual consent, i.e. gij = gji = 1.
Note that if there are no social interactions, i.e. λ = 0, individuals’ utilities
reduce to ui(y, g) =
∑
j 6=i [zijδ + ηij ] gijgji− 12 (yi− xiβ− εi)2 and the optimal
behavior for each individual is given by yi = xiβ−εi. Similarly, a link is created
only if zijδ + ηij ≥ 0. However, if λ > 0, the utility function is not separable in
(yi, gi), so the optimal decision for yi is a function of gi, and vice-versa.
The model induces a strategic form game Γ = 〈N, {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N 〉, where
Si = R× {0, 1}n−1. Let S = S1 × ...× Sn. A Nash equilibrium (NE) of Γ is an
allocation (y∗, g∗) ∈ S such that for all i ∈ N ,
(y∗i , g
∗
i ) ∈ arg max
(yi,gi)∈Si
ui(yi, y
∗
−i, gi, g
∗
−i)
2The preferences are similar to the instantaneous utility of Bisin & O¨zgu¨r (2012).
3The model can be extended to non-symmetric zij .
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Let us first consider the optimal choice of g, given y. Intuitively, individuals
should choose gi such that they keep links with a positive value and discard
links with a negative value. If this holds true, the aggregate utility function
reduces to:
wi(y) =
∑
j 6=i
max{zijδ − λ
2
(yi − yj)2 + ηij , 0} − 1
2
(yi − xiβ − εi)2 (1)
This assumes that individuals play as if every link with positive value is created.
Define Γ˜ = 〈N, {S˜i}i∈N , {wi}i∈N 〉, where S˜i = R. The following proposition
shows that the set of equilibria of Γ˜ is a subset of the equilibria of Γ.
Proposition 1. If y∗ is a NE of Γ˜, then there exists g∗ such that (y∗, g∗) is a
NE of Γ.
Proposition 1 is convenient as it reduces the dimensionality of the problem.
Note, however, that proposition 1 does not imply that any equilibrium of Γ
can be found from the resolution of Γ˜. This is because the specification in
(1) implicitly solves for the bilateral coordination problem: if i does not invest
in a link with j (i.e. gij = 0), then j has no incentive to invest in the link,
even if the value of the link is positive. This observation has motivated the
introduction of equilibrium refinements allowing for bilateral deviations such as
pairwise stability (Jackson & Wolinsky, 1996) and bilateral equilibria (Goyal &
Vega-Redondo, 2007).
In what follows, I concentrate on the analysis of Γ˜, and hence implicitly as-
sume that every link with positive value is created.4 Note that from proposition
1, any equilibrium of the modified game Γ˜ is an equilibrium of the original game
Γ.
A small technical issue with the function in (1) is that it is not differentiable
everywhere. However, the next lemma shows that wi(y) is locally differentiable
4This is a standard assumption in the empirical literature on network formation. See, for
example, Christakis et al. (2010) and Goldsmith-Pinkham & Imbens (2013).
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around its maxima, and that there exists a generically unique maximum.5
Lemma 2. Let y∗i ∈ arg maxyi wi(yi, y−i). Then, for all j 6= i, we generically
have that zijδ − λ2 (y∗i − yj)2 + ηij 6= 0. Moreover, y∗i exists and is generically
unique.
Lemma 2 says that individuals never maximize at a “kink” in the utility
function. The intuition is as follows: if i and j are linked, the choice of yi is
affected by yj . Hence, i chooses a different behavior when he is linked with j than
when he is not. The value of their link must outweigh the cost of conforming
with j. If the link has no value, i would be better off removing the link with j
and re-optimizing without j as a peer.
Lemma 2 implies that the utility functions are differentiable around their
maximum, so that it is possible to write the first-order conditions of the opti-
mization problem. This property is at the source of the identification strategy,
as it allows for the capture of the effect of marginally changing the value of y,
keeping g constant. This allows for a local analysis of the model that looks at
peer effects within a fixed network structure.
2.1. Local Analysis
From lemma 2, we can write the first-order conditions for the maximum
of wi(y), evaluated at the equilibrium (y
∗, g∗). Doing so reveals a closed-form
relation between y∗ and the Laplacian matrix of the equilibrium graph. The
Laplacian matrix L = D−G is obtained from the adjacency matrix G and
the diagonal degree matrix D, where Dii =
∑
j Gij . Let E(ai) and V ar(ai)
be the mean and variance across individuals for any variable a. This gives the
following:
Proposition 3 (Structure). Let (y∗, g∗) ∈ S be a NE of the original game Γ.
Then y∗ = (I + λL∗)−1 [Xβ + ε]. Moreover, y∗ is such that:
5In this paper, “generically” refers to results that are robust to small changes in η, or
equivalently to the fact that the set of values of η for which the proposition does not hold has
a null Lebesgue measure.
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1. E(y∗i ) = E(xiβ + εi)
2. V ar(y∗i ) ≤ V ar(xiβ + εi).
Note that proposition 3 holds for any equilibrium of the original game Γ. Note
also that the closed-form expression is always well defined, since the Laplacian
matrix is positive semi-definite, so (I + λL∗) is positive definite for any positive
λ and hence invertible. Since L∗ represents the choice of g∗, this expression
gives an equilibrium relationship between the optimal choice of y and g. Points
1 and 2 of proposition 3 are direct implications of the closed-form expression.
They characterize the effect of conformism on the distribution of behavior. The
average behavior is equal to the average individual’s type in the population,
while the variance of behaviors is always smaller. Note that those features are
implied by the conformism game for a given network, and are not a result of
the network formation process. Also note that the first point of proposition
3 implies the absence of a network multiplier for uniform policy shocks. This
feature of the conformism game is also found in Patacchini & Zenou (2012) and
Liu et al. (2011), and is discussed in Boucher & Fortin (2014). Finally, note
that it implies that the model can be estimated using within-group deviations
(see section 3).
Proposition 3 has important implications. The fact that y∗ depends on the
Laplacian matrix of the network implies that individuals are affected by the
full distribution of their peers’ behavior, as opposed to their peers’ average
behaviour, which is the approach taken by Patacchini & Zenou (2012) and most
of the empirical literature on peer effects. In order to discuss the additional
information provided by the Laplacian matrix, I express the optimal choice for
yi as a function of y−i:
yi =
λ
1 + λni
∑
j∈Ni
yj +
1
1 + λni
[xiβ + εi] (2)
yˆi =
λ
1 + λ
1
ni
∑
j∈Ni
yˆj +
1
1 + λ
[xiβ + εi] (3)
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where (2) follows from proposition 3 and (3) is the model of Patacchini & Zenou
(2012), rewriten in tems of this paper’s notation.6
For both models, the optimal choice represents a convex combination of the
individual’s type and the behavior of his peers. Model (2) differs from model
(3) mainly by the fact that the number of peers has an impact on the tradeoff
between the individual’s type and the behavior of his peers. As his number of
peers grows, an individual puts less weight on his type and more weight on the
behavior of his peers. Also note that the marginal impact of an additional peer
decreases in the number of peers that an individual has.
Returning to points 1 and 2 of proposition 3, consider the following social
welfare function:
W (y) =
∑
i
ayi +
b
2
y2i (4)
where b < 0, so the social planer is inequality averse with respect to behavior.7
Since preferences are quadratic and all the equilibria have the same mean (see
proposition 3), they can be ranked according to their variance. Point 2 of
proposition 3 thus implies that any equilibrium of the game is preferred to
a case where there would be no social interactions (i.e. when λ = 0). Put
differently, conformism has social value.
Unfortunately, there is no general comparative static result between the equi-
libria, as the equilibrium distribution of y strongly depends on the distribution
of individuals’ types. For example, increasing the number of links in a network
does not necessarily decrease the variance of equilibrium behaviors.8 However,
the variance can be bounded by functions of the network structure.
Let e(g) be the edge connectivity of g, i.e. the minimal number of links in
g that need to be removed in order to disconnect the network. Additionally,
6This is in fact a special case of their model, see equation (6) on p. 10 of Patacchini &
Zenou (2012).
7For an inequality averse social planner, social welfare is increasing with Pigou-Dalton
transfers.
8This follows from the Grone-Merris conjecture (see Bai (2011)) and the fact that V ar(yi)
is not Schur-convex in the eigenvalues of the Laplacian matrix.
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let Cij(g) = 1 +
∑
k∈Ni nk+
∑
k∈Nj nk
ni+nj
. The quantity C∗ = maxj 6=i Cij(g∗) can
be interpreted as a measure of network centrality (or polarisation) for a given
network density. I provide an illustration in the Appendix (see Figure 6). We
have the following:
Proposition 4 (Dispersion). Let (y∗, g∗) ∈ S be a NE of Γ, and define e∗ =
e(g∗), C∗ = maxj 6=i Cij(g∗) and ti = xiβ + εi, we have:
V ar(y∗i ) ≥ V ar(ti)−
t′t
n
λC∗[2 + λC∗]
[1 + λC∗]2
(5)
V ar(y∗i ) ≤ V ar(ti)−
t′t
n
+
t′t
n[1 + 2λe∗(1− cos(pi/n)]2 (6)
Figure 1 provides a visual representation of proposition 4. The lower bound
(5) is strictly decreasing in the network centrality, and the upper bound (6)
is strictly decreasing in the edge connectivity. Those bounds have important
implications for policy making.
Figure 1: Equilibrium Variance of Behavior (ti = xiβ + εi)
Var(t)0 Var(y) ConnectivityCentrality
Consider a social planner (for example, a high school principal) who wants to
reduce the variance of the equilibrium behavior. In order to decrease the lower
bound, the school’s principal should promote the centrality of the network. This
is a generalization of the key player argument (see Ballester et al. (2006)) when
the network is endogenous. Promoting strong role models improves access to
equilibrium outcomes with low variance. In practice, policies such as organizing
sports teams or tournaments is likely to generate such role models. However,
this does not guarantee that the equilibrium variance will be low, as the upper
bound can be quite large.
In order to prevent bad equilibria, a school principal should increase the
edge connectivity of the graph. Notice that if the network is disconnected, the
edge connectivity is equal to zero and the upper-bound is not binding. In order
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to decrease this upper bound, a principal should proceed by linking network
components (e.g. the principal could encourage shy students to participate in
a team activity where they can make new friends and become better integrated
with the rest of the student body). Put differently, a society composed of many
segregated groups may result in equilibria with high variances.
Proposition 4 clearly exposes the tradeoff between promoting centrality and
connectivity, as well as the implications that they have for the variance of equi-
librium behavior. Note also that, even if C∗ is not necessarily increasing in the
number of links (see Figure 6) in Appendix for an example), the expected effect
of adding links has a positive impact (i.e. decreases the expected equilibrium
variance).9
Recall that this section’s analysis is conditional on the equilibrium network
structure. I now study the full model.
2.2. Global Analysis
In order to develop an intuition of the shape of the best-response functions
in Γ˜, I start by describing an example of a best-response function in a two-
dimensional space.
Figure 2 displays an example of a best-response function for i ∈ N in the
space (yi, yj) (that is, keeping yk constant for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}). When yj is
too small, i and j are not linked and small changes in yj do not affect the value
of yi. However, as yj increases, there is a point where it becomes profitable for
i and j to form a link. The link creation has a downward discontinuous effect
on yi (since yj < y0). When yi and yj are such that i and j are linked, yi
reacts linearly to a change in yj (with a slope of
λ
λni+1
< 1, where ni is the
number of peers that i has; see proposition 3). Note that the changes in the
slope and the jumps are due to the creation or removal of links with the n− 2
other individuals. As yj increases further, there is a point where a link between
9This follows from the Grone-Merris conjecture (see Bai (2011)) and the exptression for
V ar(yi) in the proof of proposition 4.
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Figure 2: Best-Response Functions
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i and j is no longer profitable, such that yi goes back to y0 and is no longer
affected by small changes in yj .
The n-dimensional best-response function follows the same intuition. This is
problematic for existence (of a Nash equilibrium), as none of the standard fixed-
point theorems apply. However, Γ˜ is a “potential game” (Monderer & Shapley,
1996).10 A potential game is a game that admits a function ψ(y) such that for all
i ∈ N , and any yi, y′i, we have ψ(yi, y−i)−ψ(y′i, , y−i) = wi(yi, y−i)−wi(y′i, y−i).
In the case of Γ˜, a valid potential function is the following:
ψ(y) =
∑
i∈N
∑
j:j<i
max
{
zijδ − λ
2
(yi − yj)2 + ηij , 0
}
− 1
2
∑
i∈N
(yi−xiβ− εi)2 (7)
The maximum of a potential function is a NE (Monderer & Shapley, 1996).
Hence, the existence of a NE for Γ˜ (and for Γ) follows directly from the following
proposition:
10The crucial assumption on the initial game Γ that allows for the existence of a potential
function is the mutual consent assumption, i.e. the fact that the value of the link is multiplied
by gijgji.
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Proposition 5 (Potential’s maximum). The potential function ψ(y) admits
a generically unique maximum y∗.
Since the maximum of the potential is (generically) unique, it also exhibits
robustness properties. I will discuss two of those properties: trembling-hand
perfection (Carbonell-Nicolau & McLean (2011): Theorem 1), and robustness
to canonical elaborations (Ui (2001): Theorem 3). Precise definitions of these
concepts can be found in the referenced papers. I focus on the implications of
these robustness results, namely the robustness to the presence of small, uncor-
related mistakes on the part of the individuals (trembling-hand perfection), and
robustness to the presence of a small amount of imperfect information (canonical
elaborations).
Network games are complex in terms of the requirements for individual ra-
tionality. Here, individuals have to simultaneously choose the network structure
and their action. Due to the high dimensionality of the strategy space and the
potentially large number of players, the likelihood that individuals make small,
uncorrelated, mistakes while playing the game is high. Since the maximum
of the potential function is trembling-hand perfect, it is robust to such small
mistakes.
Also note that Γ is a game with complete information. This contrasts with
part of the literature on social interactions (e.g. Blume et al. (2011)). In an
economy where individuals are not ex-ante connected in a network, it seems un-
likely that all of the individuals’ characteristics are common knowledge. How-
ever, since the maximum of the potential is robust to canonical elaborations,
it is robust to the incorporation of a small amount of imperfect information,
i.e. the maximum of the potential function would still be a (Bayesian-Nash)
equilibrium if, with high probability, the individuals’ (private) types are such
that their preferences are given by (1).
These robustness properties will justify, in the next section, the assumption
that the data is generated by the potential’s maximum.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std Min Max
Number of activities 2.456 2.656 0 33
Age 14.255 1.748 10 19
Gender 0.522 0.500 0 1
White 0.625 0.484 0 1
Hispanic 0.127 0.333 0 1
Black 0.213 0.410 0 1
Asian 0.057 0.231 0 1
Mother works 0.691 0.462 0 1
Mother completed HS 0.771 0.420 0 1
Mother completed college 0.337 0.473 0 1
Number of schools: 100
Number of individuals: 30,241
Number of pairs of individuals: 9,962,501
3. Peer Effects and Extracurricular Activities
In this section, I apply the model to conformism in the choice of extracurric-
ular activities among high school students. This specific context is well adapted
to the model as teenagers are (1) more likely to participate an activity if their
friends do too, and (2) create new friendships while participating in these ac-
tivities.
I use the AddHealth database, which is widely used in empirical models of
peer effects (e.g. Badev (2013), Christakis et al. (2010), Goldsmith-Pinkham
& Imbens (2013) and Hsieh & Lee (2011)). The dependent variable represents
the number of extracurricular activities in which a teenager participates. Ex-
planatory variables include age, gender, race, and the mother’s education and
employment status. In order to reduce the computing time, I focus on the 100
smallest schools in the database. This sample comprises 30,241 individuals for a
total of 9,962,501 pairs of individuals. Table 1 presents the summary statistics.
Following proposition 3, and since 1 is an eigenvector of L, the model can be
estimated using within-group deviations. Let y˜r = (I− 1nr 11′)yr and X˜r = (I−
1
nr
11′)Xr for each school r = 1, ..., R of size nr, and define Mr(λ) = (I + λLr).
I start by describing the choice of y˜ for a fixed network structure. Following
proposition 3 and in the spirit of Lee et al. (2010), I define the following quasi-
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maximum likelihood estimator (QMLE) for y˜, given a fixed network structure
and normally distributed errors:
lnP (y˜|G, X˜;β, λ, σε, ση) = 1
R
R∑
r=1
c− 1
2
ln(|σ2εM−2r (λ)|)
− 1
2σ2ε
[
Mr(λ)y˜r − X˜rβ
]′ [
Mr(λ)y˜r − X˜rβ
]
(8)
The identification of β, σε and λ, given G, follows from standard results for
linear models (see Blume et al. (2011) or Lee et al. (2010)).
In order to estimate the full model, i.e. P (y˜,G|X˜,Z), one needs to use the
density of the network, i.e. P (G|X˜,Z). However, as discussed in section 2,
the full model typically features many equilibria. As noted by many authors
(e.g. Tamer (2003)), games with multiple equilibria may result in incoherent
estimators. Some innovative techniques have been recently proposed and applied
to address this issue (e.g. Galichon & Henry (2011)), but they unfortunately
cannot be applied here. In order to define a coherent estimator, I assume that
the data is generated by the (unique) equilibrium that maximizes the potential
function. Specifically:
Assumption 1 (Equilibrium Selection). Any observed equilibrium (y∗, g∗)
is such that:
(2.1) gij = 1 iff zijδ − λ2 (y∗i − y∗j )2 + ηij > 0 for all i, j ∈ N and
(2.2) y∗ = arg maxψ(y).
The first condition assumes that the coordination problem between i and j
has been solved so that every link with positive value is created. The second
condition says that the observed equilibrium maximizes the potential function
of the game.
Assumption 1 allows for the specification of a coherent estimator, but relies
on the fact that one is able to compute y∗ = arg maxy∈Y ψ(y). As noted in the
previous sections, the potential function is not globally concave, which makes
its maximization infeasible in practice. The estimation strategy thus consists of
using approximations of the potential function. I use the following result:
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Proposition 6. Let φ∗ be the potential function’s maximum. Also let:
6.1 - G0 be such that g0,ij = 1 iff zijδ + ηij ≥ 0, and
6.2 - G1 be such that g1,ij = 1 iff zijδ + ηij − λ2 (xiβ + εi − xjβ − εj)2 ≥ 0
Then, φ(G0) ≥ φ∗ ≥ φ(G1).
I then use P (G0|X˜,Z) and P (G1|X˜,Z) as approximations for P (G|X˜,Z).
Note that for G0, the QMLE in (8) can be estimated directly since the network
structure is exogenous. Then, the model with an exogenous network structure
represents one of the bounds of the true model. This model underestimates
the cost of creating a link by abstracting from the cost imposed by y on the
value of the links. The opposite is true for the specification for G1, where
the approximation overestimates the cost of creating a link by only considering
first-order effects.
I estimate the full approximated models using both specifications. I assume
that zij = −|xi − xj | and that ηij ∼ N(0, ση). Note that the specification for
P (G1|X˜,Z) has to be simulated, since it does not allow for a closed-form density
(see Train (2009)). Also note that P (G1|X˜,Z) allows for the identification of
δ/σε and λ/ση (see proposition 6.2) so, together with (8), all the parameters
of the model are identified. Finally, P (G0|X˜,Z) is a simple (scale-identified)
probit model.
3.1. Results
As an initial benchmark, Table 2 presents a simple (misspecified) ordinary
least squares (OLS) estimation. Participation in extracurricular activities de-
creases with age, but increases with the socio-economic status of the mother
(level of education and employment status). Blacks and Asians participate
more than whites and Hispanics. Table 3 presents the probit estimation for
the network formation process (specification 6.1). The social network features
homophily with respect to all variables, which is consistent with the literature.
Tables 4 and 5 present the quasi-maximum likelihood estimation for both
bounds of the model. Table 4 presents results for specification (6.1), while Table
5 present results for specification (6.2). The estimated coefficients for both
specifications are very similar, as are the log-likelihood values. As noted in the
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introduction, the small bias due to the endogeneity of the network is consistent
with the literature. This should not be surprising looking at the marginal effects
in Table 3. Although statistically significant, the contribution of the individual
characteristics on the probability of a link are extremely small! Then, in the
context of this particular database, the bias created by the endogeneity of the
network is also small.
Remark also that for both specifications, the coefficients associated with
individual effects are quite close to the OLS estimates. Also note that, in Table
5, none of the network formation parameters (i.e. δ) are statistically significant.
A possible explanation is that zij = −|xi−xj | is highly correlated with (xiβ+
εi − xjβ − εj)2 so the additional contribution of zi is not significant.
The estimated values for the main parameter of interest, ln(λ), are −2.5204
and −2.5149 for G0 and G1, respectively. This leads to values of λ of 8.04%
and 8.08%. However, as discussed above, the magnitude of peer effects depends
on the numbers of friends an individual has. Recall that:
yi =
λ
1 + λni
∑
j∈Ni
yj +
1
1 + λni
[xiβ + εi]
Figure 3 displays the distribution of the implied peer effects using the ob-
served distribution of the number of peers (i.e. λ1+λni , using λ = 8.08%). The
impact of a change in one peer’s behavior ranges from 4.5% (for an individual
with 10 peers) to 7.5% (for an individual with only one peer). Put differently,
when choosing the number of activities he participates in, a student with only
one friend puts a weight of 92.5% on his individual characteristics (i.e. his type),
while a student with 10 friends puts a weight of only 55% on his individual char-
acteristics (i.e. 11+λni , using λ = 8.08%).
Finally, Figure 4 presents, for each school, the variance in behavior, the
(expected) lower-bound on that variance (see proposition 4) and the variance
in individuals’ types. The average value of the lower-bound is 3.23 (based on
centrality), the average variance in behavior is 6.70 and the average variance
in individuals’ types is 8.07. As the observed networks in every schools are
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disconnected, the upper-bound is never binding.
I now discuss the policy implications of the model.
3.2. Implications for Public Policy
The model features both peer effects and self-selection. This suggests that a
policymaker can affect an equilibrium through two different channels: by using
the shape of the network, or by affecting the shape of the network. I now discuss
these two approaches.
Suppose that the policymaker wants to use the shape of network to influence
the equilibrium outcome. Specifically, suppose that the policymaker has the
ability to increase the type xiβ+εi of any individual by a small amount. Which
individual should he affect? The typical answer to that question comes from
Ballester et al. (2006): the most central individual in the network. In the
context of this paper, the aggregate impact on the sum of behaviors is the
same, irrespective on the individual selected. This follows from the fact that
1 is the eigenvector of L associated with the eigenvalue 0. The impact on the
variance of behaviors, however, depends non-trivially on the network structure,
as well as on individuals’ types, and cannot directly be linked to a centrality
measure (see proposition 4).
In any case, the precise answer to the question of which individual the poli-
cymaker should affect is likely to be irrelevant, since (1) the measured impact of
peer effect is relatively small (the value of λ1+λni ranges from 4.5% to 7.5%), and
(2) the analysis would only hold locally since large policy shocks will also affect
the structure of the network. The policymaker should then focus on affecting
the network formation process.
According to proposition 4, a policymaker can affect the network structure
by increasing the network centrality, or by increasing the edge-connectivity. As
noted above, every school in the sample is disconnected, so the edge-connectivity
is equal to 0. In order to increase the edge-connectivity, a policymaker would
have to connect the network.11 Figure 5 shows how many links would have to
11That is, adding enough links so that the network has only one component.
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Table 2: OLS - Within-Group Deviations
Variable Estimate S.E.
Age -0.0387∗∗ (0.0132)
Gender 0.2288∗∗ (0.0300)
Hispanic 0.1119∗ (0.0551)
White 0.2677∗∗ (0.0517)
Black 0.4233∗∗ (0.0609)
Asian 0.5514∗∗ (0.0749)
Mother works 0.1426∗∗ (0.0356)
Mother completed HS 0.1337∗∗ (0.0421)
Mother completed college 0.3010∗∗ (0.0356)
be added to the network, as a function of the school size. We see that for large
schools, this number can be extremely high. Figure 6 shows the relative gain of
connecting the network. We see that for large schools, the impact is quite small.
This suggests that for small schools, policymakers should focus on promoting
integration, while for larger schools, policymakers should focus on promoting
role models.
4. Conclusion
I presented a model of conformism featuring both peer effects and self-
selection. I found that the network structure and the equilibrium behaviors are
linked through the Laplacian matrix of the network. This particular relation-
ship implies that the number of peers influences the magnitude of peer effects.
Moreover, social welfare can be bounded by the centrality and edge-connectivity
of the equilibrium network.
Using the theoretical predictions of the model, I measure the impact of
conformism on student participation in extracurricular activities. I find that the
magnitude of the endogenous peer effects ranges from 7.5% to 45% depending
on an individual’s number of peers. Results indicate that small schools should
focus on promoting integration, while large schools should focus on creating role
models.
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Table 3: Probit (see proposition 6.1) - Marginal Effects †
Variable Estimate S.E.
Age 3.2727∗∗ (0.0393)
Gender 3.522∗∗ (0.0579)
Hispanic 1.1593∗∗ (0.0806)
White 1.9104∗∗ (0.0761)
Black 4.0803∗∗ (0.1108)
Asian 1.2784∗∗ (0.1071)
Mother works 0.4781∗∗ (0.0540)
Mother completed HS 1.0078∗∗ (0.0591)
Mother completed college 0.3334∗∗ (0.0519)
Log-likelihood: -141 381.53
† For each zij = −|xi − xj |, coefficients are multiplied by a factor of 1000 for ease of
interpretation.
Table 4: QMLE - Exogenous Network
Variable Estimate S.E.
ln(λ) -2.5204∗∗ (0.1317)
Age -0.0389 (0.0223)
Gender 0.2496∗∗ (0.0434)
Hispanic 0.1284 (0.0978)
White 0.2657∗∗ (0.0813)
Black 0.4364∗∗ (0.0955)
Asian 0.5653∗∗ (0.1206)
Mother works 0.1495∗∗ (0.0431)
Mother completed HS 0.128∗ (0.0503)
Mother completed college 0.3262∗∗ (0.0459)
ln(σε) 1.0382
∗∗ (0.0236)
Log-likelihood: -432.7814
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Table 5: QMLE - Full Model (Specification 6.2)
Variable Estimate S.E.
ln(λ) -2.5149∗∗ (0.1257)
Age -0.0475∗ (0.0220)
Gender 0.2502∗∗ (0.0435)
Hispanic 0.2027∗ (0.0982)
White 0.3031∗∗ (0.0809)
Black 0.5824∗∗ (0.0969)
Asian 0.6289∗∗ (0.1213)
Mother works 0.0867 (0.0448)
Mother completed HS 0.2098∗∗ (0.0514)
Mother completed college 0.3259∗∗ (0.0462)
ln(σε) 1.0380
∗∗ (0.0232)
Network Formation
Intercept 0.0155 (0.0144)
Age 0.0048 (0.005)
Gender -0.0137 (0.0156)
Hispanic 0.0050 (0.0089)
White -0.0081 (0.0126)
Black 0.0062 (0.0127)
Asian -0.0031 (0.0179)
Mother works 0.0013 (0.0035)
Mother completed HS 0.0065 (0.0079)
Mother completed college 0.0022 (0.0019)
ln(σε) -2.9911
∗∗ (0.6309)
Log-likelihood: -432.9868
Figure 3: Local Marginal Effect for One Peer ( λ
1+λni
)
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Figure 4: Variance of Types and Behaviors (All Schools)†
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† For expected variance of the types, using 1000 draws. Variances are truncated at 10 to
clarify the presentation. The upper-bound is never binding as all schools are disconnected
(the value of the upper-bound is thus always equal to the variance of the types). The
average value of the lower-bound is 3.23. The average variance of behavior is 6.70. The
average variance of the types is 8.07.
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Figure 5: Number of Links Needed to Connect the Network as a Function of School Size
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Figure 6: Reduction in Upper-Bound as a Function of the Number of Links Needed to Connect
the Network
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6. Appendix: Proofs
Proof (of Proposition 1). To simplify the notation, let υij = zijδ + ηij .
Then, simply let g∗ be such that [ g∗ij = 1 iff υij ≥ λ2 (yi − yj)2 ] for all i, j ∈ N .

Proof (f Lemma 2).
Step 1: zijδ − λ2 (yi − yj)2 + ηij 6= 0
Consider yi that maximizes the utility wi. Note that for all the ij such that
zijδ+ηij ≤ 0, any yi leads to the same value for the link, as the max is equal to
0. Then, a small perturbation of ηij will lead to the same optimal choice of yi.
Now, consider υij = zijδ + ηij > 0 and define ti = xiβ + εi and the following
sets:
Ai(y) =
{
j 6= i|yi ∈
[
yj −
√
2υij
λ
, yj +
√
2υij
λ
)}
Bi(y) =
{
j 6= i|yi ∈
(
yj −
√
2υij
λ
, yj +
√
2υij
λ
]}
Ci(y) =
{
j 6= i|yi ∈
(
yj −
√
2υij
λ
, yj +
√
2υij
λ
)}
A˜i(y) = Ai(y) \ Ci(y)
B˜i(y) = Bi(y) \ Ci(y)
Now, define the following directional derivatives:
∂+(yi) = −(yi − ti)− λ
∑
j∈Ai(y)
(yi − yj)
∂−(yi) = −(yi − ti)− λ
∑
j∈Bi(y)
(yi − yj)
It is easy to see that y∗i maximizes wi(yi, y−i) only if ∂+(yi) ≤ 0 and ∂−(yi) ≥
0, or equivalently if:
−(yi − ti) ≤ λ
∑
j∈Ai(y)
(yi − yj)
−(yi − ti) ≥ λ
∑
j∈Bi(y)
(yi − yj)
These two conditions can be met simultaneously only if∑
j∈Ai(y)
(yi − yj) ≥
∑
j∈Bi(y)
(yi − yj)
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or equivalently if ∑
j∈A˜i(y)
(yi − yj) ≥
∑
j∈B˜i(y)
(yi − yj)
Now, note that any j ∈ A˜i(y) is such that yi− yj = −
√
2υij
λ , and any j ∈ B˜i(y)
is such that yi − yj =
√
2υij
λ . Thus, it is required that
−
∑
j∈A˜i(y)
√
2υij
λ
≥
∑
j∈B˜i(y)
√
2υij
λ
which is only possible if |A˜i(y)| = |B˜i(y)| = 0.
Step 2: The maximum exists and is generically unique.
Existence follows from the fact that any yi < min{yj , ti} or yi > max{yj , ti}
is dominated by some y′i ∈ [min{yj , ti},max{yj , ti}]. Now, suppose that there
exists two maxima: yi, y
′
i. From step 1, this implies that yi and y
′
i do not induce
the same network structure, i.e. there exists j such that υij − λ2 (yi − yj)2 < 0
while υij − λ2 (y′i − yj)2 > 0. Then, taking a small perturbation of ηij , the
first-order conditions still hold for yi and y
′
i, but they no longer yield the same
utility. 
Proof (of Proposition 3).
Step 1: y = [I + λL]−1[Xβ + ε]
Let (g∗, y∗) be a NE of Γ. Since the strategy space for yi is unbounded and
from lemma 2, any NE is interior for yi, the first-order conditions need to apply.
At g∗, for all i ∈ N , the following holds: 0 = ∑j:g∗ij=g∗ji=1−λ(yi − yj) − yi +
xiβ + εi, which is equivalent to yi = −λn∗i yi +
∑
j:g∗ij=g
∗
ji=1
λyj + xiβ + εi. In
matrix form, we have:
y = −λ(D−G)y + Xβ + ε
Defining L = D −G, which is positive semi-definite (Godsil and Royle, 2001,
p.280), we have: y = [I + λL]−1[Xβ + ε].
Step 2: E(y∗i ) = E(xiβ + εi)
Remark that 1 is the eigenvector of L associated with eigenvalue 0, so
1
n
1′[I + λL]y =
1
n
1′y =
1
n
1′[Xβ + ε]
Step 3: V ar(y∗i ) ≤ V ar(xiβ + εi).
We have:
V ar(yi) =
1
n
y′y−E(yi)2 +V ar(xiβ+εi)− 1
n
[Xβ + ε]′[Xβ + ε]+E(xiβ+εi)2
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which, from step 2 above, is equivalent to:
V ar(yi) =
1
n
y′y + V ar(xiβ + εi)− 1
n
[Xβ + ε]′[Xβ + ε]
Rewriting, we have:
V ar(yi) = V ar(xiβ + εi)− λ
n
[Xβ + ε]′(I + λL)−2(2I + λL)L[Xβ + ε]
Since the product of jointly diagonalizable positive semi-definite matrices is
positive definite, (I + λL)−2(2I + λL)L is positive semi-definite (this can be
seen by applying the Spectral Theorem), with completes the proof. 
Proof (of Proposition 4). Let 0 = ξ1 ≤ ... ≤ ξn be the eigenvalues of L.
Using the expression in step 3 of the proof of proposition 3 and applying the
Spectral Theorem, we have:
V ar(yi) = V ar(xiβ + εi)− λ
n
[Xβ + ε]′T′U
(
2ξi + λξ
2
i
(1 + λξi)2
)
T[Xβ + ε]
where T is orthonormal and U(ai) is a diagonal matrix with entries a1, ..., an.
The bounds are then simply obtained by using the following bounds (see New-
man et al. (2000)):
ξn ≤ max
ij
Cij
ξ1 ≥ 2e(1− cos(pi/n))

Proof (of Proposition 5). I now show that the potential function admits a
generically unique maximum.
Let ti = xiβ + εi. Without a loss of generality, assume that t1 ≤ ... ≤ tn.
It is sufficient to show that any y is (weakly) dominated by some y∗ such that
y∗i ∈ [t1, tn] for all i ∈ N .
Consider y and a non-empty M ⊆ N such that for all i ∈ M , yi /∈ [t1, tn],
while yi ∈ [t1, tn] for all i ∈ N \M . Also define M1 = {i ∈ N |yi < t1} and
Mn = {i ∈ N |yi > tn} so that M = M1 ∪Mn. For any y, we can write ψ(y) as
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Figure 7: Example for n = 4.
C*=2 C*=3
C*=3 C*=4
C*=3 C*=11/3
k=2
k=3
k=4
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(setting empty sums to 0):
ψ(y) =
∑
i,j∈M1
max{vij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0}+
∑
i,j∈Mn
max{υij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0}
+
∑
i∈M1,j∈Mn
max{υij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0}
+
∑
i∈M1,j∈N\M
max{υij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0}
+
∑
i∈Mn,j∈N\M
max{υij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0}
+
∑
i,j∈N\M
max{υij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0}
− 1
2
∑
i∈M1
(yi − ti)2 − 1
2
∑
i∈Mn
(yi − ti)2 − 1
2
∑
i∈N\M
(yi − ti)2
Now generate the allocation y∗ such that: y∗i = yi ∀i ∈ N \M , y∗i = t1
∀i ∈M1 and y∗i = tn ∀i ∈Mn. We have:
ψ(y∗) =
∑
i,j∈M1
max{υij , 0}+
∑
i,j∈Mn
max{υij , 0}
+
∑
i∈M1,j∈Mn
max{υij − λ
2
(z1 − zn)2, 0}
+
∑
i∈M1,j∈N\M
max{υij − λ
2
(z1 − yj)2, 0}
+
∑
i∈Mn,j∈N\M
max{υij − λ
2
(zn − yj)2, 0}
+
∑
i,j∈N\M
max{υij − λ
2
(yi − yj)2, 0} − 1
2
∑
i∈M1
(t1 − ti)2
− 1
2
∑
i∈Mn
(tn − ti)2 − 1
2
∑
i∈N\M
(yi − ti)2
One can easily verify that ψ(y∗) > ψ(y), which leads to a contradiction.
Now, suppose that the equilibrium is not unique. There exists y˜, y∗ ∈
arg maxy ψ(y). Note that, by lemma 2, it implies that they do not induce the
same network structure. Then, there exists i, j ∈ N such that υij− λ2 (y˜i−y˜j)2 >
0, while υij − λ2 (y∗i − y∗j )2 < 0 (also by lemma 2). Hence, by taking a small
perturbation of ηij such that υ˜ij > υij , we have y˜ ∈ arg maxy ψ˜(y) (by lemma
2) and ψ˜(y˜) > ψ˜(y∗). 
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Proof (of Proposition 6). Remark that the potential function can be writ-
ten as follows:∑
ij∈g∗
zijδ + ηij − λ
2
y∗
′
Ly∗ − 1
2
(y −Xβ − ε)′(y −Xβ − ε)
Using proposition 3, this is equivalent to∑
ij∈g∗
zijδ + ηij +
1
2
(Xβ + ε)′ [I + λL]−1 (Xβ + ε)
We have I ≤ I + λL (in the sense of definiteness), which implies that I ≥
[I + λL]−1 so (Xβ + ε)′(Xβ + ε) ≥ (Xβ + ε)′ [I + λL]−1 (Xβ + ε). Similarly,
we have I ≥ I − λ2L2, which is equivalent to I ≥ [I − λL][I + λL] and to
[I + λL]−1 ≥ [I− λL]. Finally, it implies that (Xβ + ε)′[I + λL]−1(Xβ + ε) ≥
(Xβ + ε)′(Xβ + ε)− λ(Xβ + ε)′L(Xβ + ε). 
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